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CLOSING A DISCRIMINATION LOOPHOLE: USING
TITLE VI'S ANTI-RETALIATION PROVISION TO
PREVENT EMPLOYERS FROM REQUIRING UNLAWFUL
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AS CONDITIONS OF
CONTINUED EMPLOYMENT
Sidney Charlotte Reynolds
Abstract: Courts have long viewed mandatory arbitration agreements (MAAs) as contract
provisions that employees may accept or decline based on the common law doctrine of
employment at-will. However, employees may see such MAAs as attempts to curtail Title VII
rights and may refuse to sign them. Title VII prohibits employers from retaliating against
employees who oppose discriminatory employment practices. A legal loophole has developed
where some employers seek explicitly or implicitly to exempt themselves from Title Vii's
provisions by drafting MAAs that eliminate statutory rights and remedies from the arbitration
process or deter employees from filing discrimination claims altogether. The U.S. Supreme
Court has declared such MAAs to be contrary to the policies and purposes of Title VII. At the
same time, courts have broadly construed Title VII's anti-retaliation provision to protect
employees who might not be protected under the plain language of the provision. This
Comment argues that Title VII's anti-retaliation provision should protect employees who have
a reasonable belief that the MAAs they oppose are unlawful under Title VII and its policies
and purposes.

Mary has worked at XYZ Inc. for five years.' XYZ, noting a recent
employer trend of incorporating arbitration clauses in employment
contracts, has decided to require all its employees to sign a mandatory
arbitration agreement promising to submit any future discrimination
claims to arbitration. However, the agreement contains a provision that
the arbitrator may award no more than $5000 in punitive damages if an
employee proves intentional discrimination. Mary recognizes the
agreement as unlawful and tells this to her employer.2 She refuses to sign
the agreement.3 Because Mary's employment is at-will, XYZ may fire
her for refusing to sign the agreement. XYZ fires Mary. This Comment
addresses whether Mary should have any legal recourse in this situation.
A mandatory arbitration agreement (MAA) is a contract clause in
which parties agree to submit any claim arising from the contract to

1. Hypothetical created by the author.
2. In the case of intentional discrimination, the statutory cap for damages under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) is $300,000. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)(3) (2000).
3. At least one employee has filed a wrongful discharge claim after being fired for refusing to sign
a mandatory arbitration agreement (MAA). See Lagatree v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps
LLP, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 664, 668 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
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arbitration instead of filing the claim in court.4 An MAA usually creates
a specific arbitration scheme, including how to choose the arbitrators,
what law will govern the dispute, and other guidelines, such as remedial
limits. 5 Employers often condition the retention of an employee on the
signing of an MAA. 6 However, MAAs in employment contracts
sometimes contain provisions that violate the policies and purposes of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).' The U.S. Supreme
Court has declared such MAAs unlawful.8 Sometimes employees dispute
the validity of this kind of MAA once they have a Title VII claim they
wish to file in federal court.9 Federal courts have invalidated many such
MAAs and have allowed employees to pursue their claims.1" However,
courts have observed that between the time an employee signs the MAA
and the time it is invalidated, the MAA undermines Title VII by
shielding employers from the full force of its provisions."
This Comment argues that if an employer fires an employee who
refuses to sign an MAA because it unlawfully mandates the waiver of
Title VII rights and remedies, then the employee should have a viable
retaliation claim against the employer. Part I explains private arbitration
systems and employment at-will, and tracks the rise of arbitration in the
employment context. Part II examines Title VII and its protections
against employment discrimination. Part II continues by addressing Title
VIl's prohibition against retaliation against employees who complain of
employer practices made unlawful by Title VII and the broad
construction courts have afforded this anti-retaliation provision. Part III
discusses how Title VII and other statutory schemes limit employers'
ability to enforce MAAs that explicitly or implicitly shelter employers
4. Sharona Hoffman, MandatoryArbitration:Alternative DisputeResolution or Coercive Dispute
Suppression?, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 131, 132 (1996).

5. Id.
6. Harry T. Edwards, Where Are We Headingwith Mandatory Arbitrationof Statutory Claims in
Employment?, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 293,297 (1999).
7. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000)).
8. See infra Part III.B.
9. See, e.g., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 940 (4th Cir. 1999); Cole v. Bums
Int'l See. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Kinney v. United Healtheare Servs., 83 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 348, 351 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
10. This Comment focuses exclusively upon individuals that are already employed. Whether or
not job applicants would have a cause of action for retaliation in such circumstances is beyond its
scope. For an example of a case addressing whether a job applicant has a cause of action for
retaliation, see Ruggles v. Cal. Polytechnic State Univ., 797 F.2d 782, 786 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding
that job applicant does have a cause of action for retaliation in a failure-to-hire situation).
11. See infra Part III.B.
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from the full force of Title VII. Finally, Part IV argues that Title VII's
anti-retaliation provision should protect employees who oppose MAAs
because those MAAs unlawfully require them to surrender rights or
remedies under Title VII. Therefore, an employer who terminates an
employee for refusing to sign an MAA made unlawful by Title VII
should be liable for violating the statute's anti-retaliation provision.
I.

ARBITRATION, EMPLOYMENT AT-WILL, AND THE RISE
OF MAAS

Arbitration is a process by which opposing parties resolve their
disputes privately, outside the judicial system. 2 Parties forgo a judicial
forum and present their evidence to an arbitrator who acts as decision
maker in a less formal and less adversarial setting. 3 There are some
distinct advantages to arbitration for both parties, such as efficiency,
reduced cost, and quicker dispute resolution.' 4
The traditional employment at-will doctrine allows employers
contractual freedom in creating MAAs. Employees who do not agree to
submit all employment-related legal claims to arbitration instead of to
courts may lose their jobs.' 5 Within the past ten years, arbitration has
become an increasingly popular method for resolving disputes, and
employers have included MAAs in their employment contracts more
frequently.' 6 Although courts historically were reluctant to uphold such
agreements, the 1925 Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 7 compelled a
change of judicial attitude.
A.

The Employment At-Will Rule

At-will employment represents the traditional common-law
relationship between employer and employee. 8 "At-will" means either
party may terminate the employment relationship at any time. 9 It also
12. Lewis L Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 1999 A.B.A.
SEC. DisP. RESOL. 1, 3.
13. See id. at 5.
14. Hoffman, supra note 4, at 133.
15. Maltby, supra note 12, at 4.
16. Id. at 4.
17. 9 U.s.C. §§ 1-16 (2000).
18. Deborah A. Ballam, Exploding the OriginalMyth Regarding Employment At-Will: The True
Originsof the Doctrine,BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L 91, 94 (1996).
19. Id.

959
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means that employers may draft employment contracts tailored to their
needs, and employees are free to sign the contracts or reject them in
favor of other employment opportunities.2 0 Absent an explicit contract
requiring employers to dismiss only for just cause, or a state or federal
statute prohibiting discrimination, a majority of states, including Ninth
Circuit states such as Washington, 2' Hawaii,22 Montana, 3 and
California, 4 recognize employment at-will as the default doctrine.25
B.

Employers' Increasing Use of MAAs in Employment Contracts

The doctrine of employment at-will allows employers and employees
to sign MAAs in which they agree to submit employment-related claims
to arbitration rather than to the courts.2 6 Because most states follow the
at-will rule, employees may accept or decline to sign the MAA, although
declining usually means losing their jobs.2 7 As the courts and Congress
have expanded the scope of protection against employment
discrimination, large judgments, lengthy jury trials, and exorbitant legal
costs have made arbitration more attractive to employers, and the use of
MAAs in employment contracts has increased. 28 However, the private
arbitration systems established in MAAs sometimes unfairly favor
employers by deterring employees from filing claims or restricting the
remedies the arbitrator may award to a prevailing employee. 9

20. Maltby, supranote 12, at 6.
21. Roberts v. At. Richfield Co., 88 Wash. 2d 887, 891, 568 P.2d 764, 767 (1977).
22. Shoppe v. Gucci Am., Inc., 14 P.3d 1049, 1064 (Haw. 2000).
23. Prout v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 772 P.2d 288, 290 (Mont. 1989).
24. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 385 (Cal. 1988).
25. Fadeyi v. Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Lubbock, Inc., 160 F.3d 1048, 1049 n.l 1 (5th Cir.
1998) (citing numerous cases utilizing the employment at-will doctrine).
26. See Maltby, supra note 12, at 9.
27. See id.
28. Ronald Turner, Compulsory Arbitration of Employment DiscriminationClaims with Special
Reference to the Three A 's-Access, Adjudication. and Acceptability, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 231,
264 (1996). Prior to 1991, very few employers considered MAAs to be necessary. Id. at 263. By
1997, about nineteen percent of employers were using them. Maltby, supranote 12 at 4.
29. See. e.g., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 940 (4th Cir. 1999); Cole v. Bums
Int'l. Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Kinney v. United Heathcare Servs., 83 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 348, 351 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
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C.

The FAA and the Evolving JudicialAttitude TowardMAAs

The judicial attitude toward arbitration agreements has evolved from
skepticism to endorsement.3 ° Historically, judges did not trust arbitration
because the arbitrator takes the judge's place in the legal proceedings."
32
In 1925, however, Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).
The FAA is a federal statute governing the enforcement of arbitration
agreements in commercial contracts.33 It requires judges to enforce predispute arbitration agreements in commercial contracts unless there is a
contract law basis (such as duress or unconscionability) for invalidating
them. 4 However, courts have remained cautious about enforcing MAAs
that encompass not just contract claims, but also claims that arise under
federal statutes.35
The FAA provides in relevant part that a "contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract."36 With this language, Congress mandated that courts uphold
valid arbitration agreements despite judicial mistrust of arbitration.37
For decades after the passage of the FAA, the U.S. Supreme Court
remained skeptical of arbitration, particularly when the claim involved
statutorily created rights.38 Beginning in the 1980s, the Court began to
abandon its mistrust of arbitration and to enforce MAAs in the

30. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435 (1953) (noting that effectiveness of Securities Act
protections is lessened in arbitration); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974)
(finding that prior arbitral decision does not foreclose filing of Title VII claim in court); Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626-27 (1985) (recognizing demise of
'Judicial suspicion of... desirability of arbitration"); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500
U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (holding commercial arbitration agreements enforceable unless invalid under
traditional contract law).
31. Turner, supranote 28, at 231 n.3.
32. United States Arbitration Act of 1925, 43 Stat. 883 (current version at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16

(2000)).
33. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
34. Id.
35. See infra Part IlI.A.
36. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
37. Turner, supranote 28, at 231-32.
38. See, eg., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435 (1953) (refusing to compel arbitration of claims
arising under the Securities Act).
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commercial context. 39 The Court's opinion in Southland Corp. v.

Keating"° strongly supports judicial enforcement of arbitration
agreements in commercial contracts negotiated by parties of relatively
equal
bargaining
strength.4'
In Rodriguez de
Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc.,42 the Court removed any remaining

doubts as to its view of MAAs in the commercial context.43 The Court
mandated that MAAs be enforced unless they contain provisions illegal
under traditional contract law. 4
Whether the FAA governs individual employment contracts was a
long-disputed issue finally settled in March 2001. Section One of the
FAA exempts the contracts of workers "in interstate commerce" from the
mandate of the FAA.46 For years, courts debated about whether only
transportation workers were included, or whether this was standard
commerce clause language meant to reach any worker in the stream of
commerce.47 The Supreme Court, however, has recently held that Section
One applies only to contracts of transportation workers, and therefore
other employment contracts are governed by the FAA.48
II.

RIGHTS AND REMEDIES UNDER TITLE VII

Title VII, a major exception to the employment at-will rule, makes it
unlawful for employers to discriminate against certain protected classes
of employees, both in hiring and firing practices and in the terms and
conditions of employment. 49 Title VII establishes complex enforcement
mechanisms, including a federal agency to receive complaints and

39. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480-81 (1989);
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626-27 (1985); Southland
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1,7 (1984).
40. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
41. See id. at7.
42. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
43. Id. at 481.
44. Id. at 483. For example, the Court noted that an MAA would still be voidable if it inherently
conflicted with the underlying purposes of a statute. Id.
45. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 121 S.Ct. 1302, 1311 (2001). This decision "likely will
speed the already fast-growing use of arbitration clauses in employment contracts .... " Robert S.
Greenberger, Justices Back Arbitration Use in Work Arena, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 2001, at A3.
46. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
47. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 36 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
48. Adams, 121 S.Ct. at 1306.
49. 42 U.S.C § 2000c-2 (2000).
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attempt conciliation, a cause of action for private individuals to sue
employers, and extensive damage provisions." It also provides
employees with a cause of action to sue employers who fire them in
retaliation for opposing employment practices made unlawful by Title
VI. 5" Courts have construed this anti-retaliation provision broadly to
effectuate the purposes of Title VII in ending employment
discrimination.52
A.

Overview of Title VII Structure and Remedies

Title VII makes it unlawful for employers "to refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual.., because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin." 3 This prohibition against
discrimination covers intentionally discriminatory treatment, such as
refusing to hire an applicant because of his or her race. 4 It also includes
employer practices that have a "disparate impact" on employment
conditions for protected groups. 5 Disparate impact refers to the
discriminatory effect of a facially neutral employment practice." For
example, an employer might want to categorize employees by giving
them an intelligence test. If the test does not screen for specific job
qualifications and negatively affects a protected group's terms or
conditions of employment, it has a disparate impact.5
Congress charged the EEOC with responsibility for enforcing Title
VII. After an employee becomes aware of his or her employer's alleged
unlawful employment practice, the employee must file a complaint with
the EEOC within 300 days.59 The EEOC investigates employee
complaints of discrimination and tries to resolve them by "conference,
conciliation, and persuasion."6 If successful, an amicable agreement is
made between the employee and employer."' If unsuccessful, the EEOC,
50. Id. § 2000e-5.
51. Id. § 2000e-3.
52. See infra Part II.B.3.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
54. Id.
55. Id. § 2000e-2.
56. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,430 (1971).
57. See id.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4.
59. Id. § 2000e-5(e)(1).
60. Id. § 2000e-5(b).
61. Id.
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the U.S. Attorney General, or the aggrieved employee has 180 days to
file a civil suit in federal court.
If an employee proves either intentional or disparate impact
employment discrimination in court, remedies are extensive. They
include back pay and other actual monetary damages the employee has
incurred,6" injunctions and other equitable relief to stop the unlawful
employment practice in the future, 6 ' attorneys' fees,6'and expert fees. 66 If
the employee proves intentional discrimination, the employee may also
67
receive compensatory damages such as money for "pain and suffering
and punitive damages up to $300,000 to punish the employer for the
wrongful conduct. 5
B.

Title VII's Anti-RetaliationProvision as an Exception to At- Will
Employment

Prohibition of discrimination is not the only exception to the at-will
rule.69 Anti-retaliation provisions prohibit employers from dismissing
employees who make complaints about potentially unlawful employment
practices. 7' Title VII contains such an anti-retaliation provision. 7 1 Courts
have construed the provision broadly to afford employees substantial
protection from employers who fire them for complaining about
potentially discriminatory practices under Title VII. 72
1.

History of the Anti-RetaliationDoctrine

Beginning with the rise of unions in the early part of the twentieth
century, courts and legislatures developed anti-retaliation laws as an

62. Id. § 2000e-5(f).

63. Id. § 2000e-5(g).
64. Id.
65. Id. § 2000e-5(k).
66. Id. § 1988(c).

67. Id. § 1981(b)(3). Compensatory damages include: "future pecuniary losses, emotional
pain ... and other nonpecuniary damages." Id.
68. Id. §1981a(b)(1).
69. Edward T. Ellis & Suzanne 0. Rudder, CurrentDevelopments in the Law of Retaliation,SF03
ALI-ABA 241, 243 (2000).
70. Id.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
72. See infra Part II.B.3.
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exception to the at-will rule.73 In 1935, Congress passed the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 4 which protects the right to unionize."
The NLRA includes a provision making it unlawful for an employer to
fire or otherwise retaliate against an employee for complaining to a
government agency or for giving testimony in proceedings about
potential violations of the NLRA.7 6 This language became known as an
"anti-retaliation" provision.77 Many federal statutes prohibiting
employment discrimination, including Title VI[," the Americans with
Disabilities Act,79 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,8"
contain anti-retaliation provisions similar to the one in the NLRA.8
2.

Title Vii's Anti-Retaliation Provision

The anti-retaliation provision of Title VII forbids discrimination
against employees who protest allegedly discriminatory employment
practices.82 The provision states that an employer may not "discriminate
against any [employee] ... because he has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by this subchapter."83 Title VII prohibits
both intentional discrimination and disparate impact discrimination based
on an individual's "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."" The
anti-retaliation provision enables employees to watch over their
employers and report unlawful practices without risking their jobs."
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, an
employee must show that: (1) he or she was engaged in a "protected
activity" (actions against which an employer may not retaliate); (2) he or
she was a victim of "adverse employment action;" and (3) there is a

73. Ellis & Rudder, supra note 69, at 253.
74. 49 Stat. 452 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-197 (2000)).

75. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2).
76. Id. § 158(a)(4).
77. Kurtis A. Kemrper, Annotation, Who Has "Participated"in Investigation, Proceeding, or
Hearingand is Thereby Protectedfrom Retaliation Under§ 704(a) of Title VII of CivilRightsAct of
1964 (42 U.S.CA. §2000E-3(a)), 149 A.L.R. FED. 431, §2 (1998).
78. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000).

79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. §§ 12,101-213.
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2000).
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-3(a), 12,203(a); 29 U.S.C. § 623(d).
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,796 (1973).

83. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
84. Id. § 2000e-2.
85. Ellis & Rudder, supra note 69, at 243.
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causal link between the protected activity and the adverse action.86 Under
the second element, discharge is unquestionably an "adverse
employment action," an action that negatively affects terms or conditions
of employment." With respect to the first and third elements, courts have
devoted considerable attention to what constitutes "protected activity"
and whether a causal nexus exists.88
3.

JudicialInterpretationsof the Scope of Title Vii's Anti-Retaliation
Provision
Retaliation liability is much broader than discrimination liability.89

Courts have construed "protected activity" broadly.9" Thus, most circuit
courts have protected from retaliation white employees who complain
about discrimination against black co-workers, employees who make
informal complaints, and employees who have a reasonable but mistaken
belief that an employment practice is unlawful. 9 Nevertheless, the
judiciary has placed limits on the scope of retaliation claims it will
entertain by requiring plaintiffs to prove a causal nexus between the
activity and the employer's alleged retaliatory action. 92
a.

The BroadInterpretationof ProtectedActivity

Courts have broadly construed "protected activity" not only in terms
of the kind of activity protected from retaliation, but also whom the antiretaliation provision protects. 93 Title VIl's anti-retaliation provision
generally protects employees who make informal complaints about

86. See Folkerson v. Circus Circus Enter., 107 F.3d 754, 755 (9th Cir. 1997); EEOC v. Avery
Dennison Corp., 104 F.3d 858, 860 (6th Cir. 1997).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3; see also Ruggles v. Cal. Polytechnic State Univ., 797 F.2d 782, 786 (9th
Cir. 1986) (holding that closing of job opening and loss of opportunity to compete for position is
"adverse employment decision").
88. See infra Part 11.13.3.
89. See infra Part Il.B.3.a.
90. See NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 122 (1972) ("[T]extual analysis [of the NLRA's antiretaliation provision] alone ... reveals.., an intent on the part of Congress to afford broad rather
than narrow protection to the employee."); Payne v. McLemore's Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654
F.2d 1130, 1139 (5th Cir. 1981).
91. See infra Part III.B.3.a.
92. See infra Part 111.13.2.
93. See. e.g., Maynard v. City of San Jose, 37 F.3d 1396, 1403 (9th Cir. 1994); EEOC v. Crown
Zellerbach Corp., 720 F.2d 1008, 1012 (9th Cir. 1983).
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intentionally discriminatory actions.94 It also protects third party
employees who are not victims of discrimination, for example white
employees who assist black employees with Title VII claims.95
Interestingly, most circuits include complaints about activities that
employees reasonably suspect are unlawful, but that turn out to be
lawful.96 Nevertheless, retaliation claims generally demand a factspecific inquiry."
A classic protected activity is filing a charge with the EEOC alleging
employer discrimination barred by Title VII s The statute explicitly
protects this activity.99 However, employees need not contact the EEOC
before Title VII's anti-retaliation provision protects them.' ° Five circuits
have defined "protected activity" to include informal complaints to the
employer or to third parties. 1 ' For example, in EEOC v. Crown
Zellerbach Corp., ' 2 the Ninth Circuit held that a letter complaining of
discriminatory activities sent to a customer of the employer was
protected activity, even though it was not classic opposition to unlawful
practices. 103 In a later case, the Ninth Circuit justified the Crown
Zellerbach expansion of protected activity by explaining that a narrow
interpretation of protected activity would chill the assertion of
employees' right to be free from discrimination and frustrate the
purposes of Title VII. 0

94. Crown Zellerbach, 720 F.2d at 1012.
95. Maynard,37 F.3d at 1403.
96. See, eg., Rodriguez-Hernandez v. Miranda-Velez, 132 F.3d 848, 855 (lst Cir. 1998); HuntGolliday v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago, 104 F.3d 1004, 1014 (7th Cir.
1997); Reed v. A.W. Lawrence & Co., 95 F.3d 1170, 1178 (2d Cir. 1996); Moyo v. Gomez, 40 F.3d
982, 984 (9th Cir. 1994); Meeks v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, 15 F.3d 1013, 1021 (1lth Cir. 1994);
Drinkwater v. Union Carbide Corp., 904 F.2d 853, 866 (3d Cir. 1990); Booker v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1312 (6th Cir. 1989); Love v. Re/Max of Am., Inc., 738
F.2d 383, 385 (10th Cir. 1984); Sisco v. J.S. Alberici Const. Co., 655 F.2d 146, 150 (8th Cir. 1981);
Payne v. McLemore's Wholesale & Retail Stores, Inc., 654 F.2d 1130,1138 (5th Cir. 1981).
97. See, eg., Rodriguez-Hernandez,132 F.3d at 855; Hunt-Golliday, 104 F.3d at 1014; Reed, 95
F.3d at 1178; Moyo, 40 F.3d at 984.
98. See, eg., Ruggles v. Cal. Polytechnic State Univ., 797 F.2d 782, 787 (9th Cir. 1986).
99. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a) (2000).
100. Sumner v. U.S. Postal Serv., 899 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 1990).
101. Robbins v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist., 186 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir. 1999); Barber v.
CSX Distrib. Servs. 68 F.3d 694, 702 (3d Cir. 1995); Sumner, 899 F.2d at 209; Rollins v. Florida
Dept. of Law Enforcement, 868 F.2d 397, 400 (1 lth Cir. 1989); EEOC v. Crown Zellerbach Corp.,
720 F.2d 1008, 1014 (9th Cir. 1983).
102. 720 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1983).
103. Id. at 1012-13.
104. Trent v. Valley Elec. Ass'n, 41 F.3d 524, 526 (9th Cir. 1994).
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Furthermore, an employee may have a claim for retaliation without
being a victim of discrimination. 05 In Maynard v. City of San Jose,116 a
white male employee assisted a black co-worker with a discrimination
complaint. 0 7 The employer harassed the white employee and decreased
his responsibilities. 8 The court held that Title Vil's anti-retaliation
provision protected him because allowing the retaliation to occur against
the white employee would perpetuate the harmful effects of the unlawful
discriminatory treatment of his black co-worker."9
Finally, the broad interpretation given to anti-retaliation laws has led
many courts to find that an employee can sustain a retaliation claim even
if no discrimination actually occurs but the employee has a reasonable
belief that an employer's practice is unlawful under Title VII." This
expansive rule contravenes the express language of the statute, which
protects those employees who oppose practices made unlawful by Title
VII."' For example, in Moyo v. Gomez," 2 a prison fired a corrections
officer for refusing to obey an order to deny showers to black inmates
after work shifts.' The officer filed a retaliation claim under Title VII,
alleging that the order denying showers constituted an unlawful
employment practice under Title VII.'" The EEOC had previously
declared that inmates were not "employees" for the purposes of Title
VII." 5 Therefore, the practice he opposed was actually a lawful practice
under Title V16 However, the Ninth Circuit held that the officer stated
a cause of action because he demonstrated a reasonable belief that the

105. See, e.g., Lowrey v. Texas A & M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242,251 (5th Cir. 1997); Maynard v.
City of San Jose, 37 F.3d 1396, 1403 (9th Cir. 1994); Skinner v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 859 F.2d
1439, 1446-47 (10th Cir. 1988).
106. 37 F.3d 1396 (9th Cir. 1994).
107. Id. at 1400.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1403 (citing Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 237 (1969)).
110. See, e.g., Robbins v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist., 186 F.3d 1253, 1259 (10th Cir. 1999);
Rodriguez-Hemandez v. Miranda-Velez, 132 F.3d 848, 855 (1st Cir. 1998); Moyo v. Gomez, 40
F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 1994); Drinkwater v. Union Carbide Corp., 904 F.2d 853, 865 (3d Cir.
1990).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2000).
112. 40 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 1994).
113. Id. at 984.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See id. Such a practice would likely be vulnerable to challenge under another federal statute
or the federal constitution.
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practice was unlawful under Title VII. 7 The court found his belief to be
reasonable, even though the law concerning the employment status of
inmates was clear."'
The court construed "reasonable" broadly because Title VII requires
employees neither to be familiar with all the factual and legal issues in a
potential case, nor to be able to analyze the case law and come to the
correct conclusion." 9 Therefore, the court interpreted "reasonable" to be
a mixed standard of objective and subjective elements, where the court
examines the facts and law from the average employee's perspective to
determine whether his or her belief was "reasonable."'20 Eight other
circuits have likewise held that a reasonable belief that a practice is
unlawful is enough to sustain the plaintiffs claim, even if the practice
2
complained of turns out to be legal.1 '
b.

An Employee Must Establisha Nexus Between the Protected
Activity and the Alleged RetaliatoryAction

Courts' broad interpretation of "protected activity" does not imply that
every employee challenge to an alleged discriminatory employment
practice is a protected activity." An employee must establish the third

117. Id. at 985.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Rodriguez-Hemandez v. Miranda-Velez, 132 F.3d 848, 855 (lst Cir. 1998); Hunt-Golliday
v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago, 104 F.3d 1004, 1014 (7th Cir. 1997); Reed v.
A.W. Lawrence & Co., 95 F.3d 1170, 1178 (2d Cir. 1996); Meeks v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, 15
F.3d 1013, 1021 (11th Cir. 1994); Drinkwater v. Union Carbide Corp., 904 F.2d 853, 866 (3d Cir.
1990); Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1312 (6th Cir. 1989); Love v.
Re/Max of Am., Inc., 738 F.2d 383,385 (10th Cir. 1984); Sisco v. J.S. Alberici Const. Co., 655 F.2d
146, 150 (8th Cir. 1981); Payne v. McLemore's Wholesale & Retail Stores, Inc., 654 F.2d 1130,
1138 (5th Cir. 1981). The Supreme Court recently reversed a Ninth Circuit holding that a female
employee who claimed she was punished for complaining about an isolated sexual comment was
entitled to anti-retaliation protection. Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 121 S.Ct. 1508, 1509
(2001). The Court did not address the propriety of the "reasonable belief' rule, but it held that the
employee's belief that one isolated comment could constitute an violation of Title VII was not
reasonable. Id. at 1510.
122. See, eg., Folkerson v. Circus Circus Enters., 107 F.3d 754, 756 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that
opposition must be to discriminatory practice of employer, not private individual); Roth v. Lutheran
Gen. Hosp., 57 F.3d 1446, 1460 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that plaintiff's baseless accusations of
discrimination provided no grounds for retaliation claim); Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d
1406, 1411 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that disc jockey's complaints about radio station programming
change were not an "activity protected by Title VII" because they related to the desire to maintain
the "value of his radio personality").
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prong of a retaliation claim: causation. 123 Causation means that the
employer fired the employee as a result of the protected activity rather
than for a legitimate reason.124 Thus, if the employee is disruptive to the
workplace-for example, by blocking access to the employer's place of
125
business-courts will generally find that the dismissal was legitimate.
Also, Title VIl's anti-retaliation provision does not protect employees
who, in the guise of "protected activity," make defamatory statements
against their employers." 6 For example, a court has held that Title VII's
anti-retaliation provision did not protect an employee who sent a
memorandum to her supervisor containing libelous statements about the
employer's allegedly discriminatory employment practices. 7 Other
legitimate reasons for dismissal include unsatisfactory job
performance,"' engaging in disruptive or excessively hostile behavior,"'
or refusing to accept additional work duties. 30 These defenses protect
law-abiding employers who fire employees for legitimate reasons, even
though circumstances may suggest that the employee has a retaliation
claim. 3 '
III.

MAAS MAY NOT LIMIT STATUTORY RIGHTS AND
REMEDIES, PARTICULARLY THOSE UNDER TITLE VII

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that when employees agree to
submit federal statutory claims to arbitration, they agree only to a change
of forum, not a change of substantive rights and remedies under a
statute.132 The Court has been cautious in examining MAAs involving
Title VII claims because federal courts play an important role in
enforcing Title VII. 33 Nevertheless, employers sometimes unlawfully
123. Folkerson, 107 F.3d at 755.
124. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
125. Id. at 803.
126. Bartulica v. Paculdo, 411 F. Supp. 392, 397 (D. Mo. 1976).
127. Id.
128. See Sorensen v. City of Aurora, 984 F.2d 349, 354 (10th Cir. 1993); McNairn v. Sullivan,
929 F.2d 974, 980 (4th Cir. 1991); Canitia v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 903 F.2d 1064, 1067 (6th
Cir. 1990).
129. See Hochstadt v. Worcester Found. for Experimental Biology, 545 F.2d 222, 234 (1st Cir.
1976).
130. See Smith v. Tex. Dept. of Water Res., 818 F.2d 363, 367 (5th Cir. 1987).
131. See Ellis & Rudder, supra note 69, at 244.
132. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985).
133. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44-45 (1974).
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use MAAs to limit, explicitly or implicitly, the substantive rights and
remedies available to employees under Title VII.L '
A.

The Supreme Court'sProtection ofFederalStatutory Rights and
Remedies in FAA Cases

Although the Supreme Court has become less skeptical of arbitration
since the passage of the FAA, it has remained cautious about enforcing
MAAs that govern federal statutory claims.135 The Court has held that
despite the FAA, statutory rights and remedies should be available in
arbitration just as they would be in court.1 36 For example, an MAA may
not contain a provision that prohibits a plaintiff from filing a charge of
discrimination with the EEOC, making a claim
under a particular federal
37
statute, or recovering monetary damages. 1
In Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo., 13 an employee participated in
an arbitration of his Title VII discrimination claims pursuant to a
collective bargaining agreement. 139 After the arbitrator dismissed his
claims, the employee filed a Title VII discrimination suit in federal
court. 4 ° The Supreme Court held that an individual employee does not
waive his or her right to file a civil suit under Title VII simply because
his or her union has a collective bargaining agreement to arbitrate
contract-based employment claims. 4 ' The Court emphasized the
importance of Title VII's purpose and declared that "final142
responsibility
for enforcement of Title VII is vested with federal courts.'
In the 1980s, the Court continued to enforce MAAs encompassing
statutory claims as long as the MAA did not reduce statutory rights and
remedies. 43 For example, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-

134. See infra Part III.B.
135. See, eg., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Corp., 500 U.S. 20,26 (1991); Mitsubishi,473 U.S. at
627; Alexander, 415 U.S. at 44.
136. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26; Mitsubishi,473 U.S. at 628; Alexander, 415 U.S. at 44.
137. See infra Part III.B.
138. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
139. Id. at 39. Because the arbitration clause was contained in a collective bargaining agreement,
the Court has subsequently held Alexander to apply only in that context and not in the context of
individual employment contracts. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 34-35.
140. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 42-43.

141. Id. at 43.
142. Id. at 44.

143. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989); Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
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Plymouth, Inc.,"' a consumer filed a claim in federal district court
pursuant to a federal antitrust statute. 4 5 The defendant, an automobile
manufacturer, sought to compel arbitration of the claim in accordance
with the terms of an MAA previously signed by the consumer.'4 6 The
Supreme Court held that the MAA was enforceable because it
sufficiently protected the consumer's statutory rights and remedies in
arbitration."' However, the Court emphasized that MAAs may not be a
vehicle for the waiver of federal statutory rights and remedies because "a
party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute [in an
MAA]; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a
judicial, forum."4

In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,49 the Court reemphasized the importance of preserving statutory rights in MAAs.'50 In
that case, a securities broker signed a registration form containing an
MAA.'' His employer terminated his employment at age sixty-two, in
possible violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 5 ' so he
filed a claim in federal court.'53 The Court held the agreement
enforceable and compelled arbitration.'5 4 However, the Court
acknowledged the Mitsubishi line of cases and reaffirmed that arbitration
agreements should constitute only a change of forum, not a reduction of
statutory rights.155

144. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
145. Id. at 618.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 628.
148. Id.
149. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
150. Id. at 26.
151. Id. at 23. The New York Stock Exchange rules require all brokers to sign this registration
form if they are to do business with the exchange. Id.
152. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2000).
153. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
154. Id. at 23.
155. Id. at 26.
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B.

Employers Sometimes Seek To Have Employees Sign MAAs To
Shelter Themselves from Employees' Title VflRights and Remedies

The EEOC has recognized that some employers draft MAAs that
"flagrantly eviscerat[e] core rights and remedies" of Title VII.156
Considering the extensive remedies available under Title VII, employers
may desire to create arbitration schemes in employment contracts that
limit the employer's liability for future discrimination."5 7 Employers
might do this explicitly by restricting the damages available under Title
VII to a level far below the statutory limits. 8 They might also do so
implicitly by requiring employees to pay up-front arbitration costs so
high as to deter employees from filing claims altogether." 9 Such MAAs
are unlawful according to the rule reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in
Gilmer: arbitration should be a change of forum, not a change of rights or
remedies.' 60 However, the FAA allows courts to invalidate commercial
arbitration agreements only for reasons available under traditional
contract law.' 6 ' Therefore, many courts faced with MAAs that do restrict
substantive rights and remedies under Title VII have either reformed the
contract or invalidated it on breach of contract, public policy, or

unconscionability grounds. 6 '
1.

CasesInvolving Explicit Shelters

Employers sometimes use MAAs to restrict the damages available to
employees who successfully show discrimination under Title VII. 63 In

156. EEOC, POLICY STATEMENT ON MANDATORY BINDING ARBITRATION OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION DISPUTES, No. 915.002, at 15 (July 10, 1997).
157. See Maltby, supranote 12, at 5-6.
158. See infra Part II.B.l and accompanying text.
159. See infra Part lII.B.2 and accompanying text.
160. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26. Although Gilmer dealt with a claim under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, circuits addressing the question have agreed that Gilmer also applies to Title VII
actions. See EEOC v. Frank's Nursery Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448, 448 n.2 (6th Cir. 1999);
Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Mkts., Inc., 167 F.3d 361, 364 (7th Cir. 1999); cf. Duffield v. Robertson
Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1198 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that 1991 Amendments to Civil
Rights Act reflect Congress's intent to codify and extend Gardner-Denver rule excluding
enforcement of MAAs in Title VII cases).
161. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
162. See, ag., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 39 F. Supp. 2d 582, 624 (D.S.C. 1998), aff'd 173
F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999); Stirlen v. Supercuts, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 158-59 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
163. Hooters, 39 F. Supp. 2d at 599; Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054,
1060 (11th Cir. 1998); Stirlen, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 158-59.
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Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips,'64 the MAA granted the employer
complete discretion in designing the arbitration rules. 65 The rules the
employer adopted limited virtually every remedial measure in Title VII
to amounts far below what Title VII allows.' 66 For example, the
employer's rules capped punitive damages at $13,000 while the Title VII
statutory cap is $300,000.167 Also, the rules precluded the arbitration
panel from ordering any injunctive relief, such as an order to stop
Hooters from engaging in discriminatory policies or practices, where
Title VII explicitly provides for such relief.168 The district court held that
these damage restrictions were inadequate to protect federal statutory
rights as required by Gilmer. 69 Therefore, the subsequent rules were
unconscionable and violated Title VII's public policies. 7 ° The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court decision. 7' Although
the appeals court made no comment on the district court's findings of
unconscionability and violation of public policy, it did hold that the
employer had completely breached its contractual duty to arbitrate by
"creating a sham system unworthy even of the name of arbitration."'7
Other employers have also unsuccessfully attempted to include
For example, in
restrictions on Title VII damages in MAAs.'
4
Derrickson v. CircuitCity Stores, Inc., the MAA provided for only one
year of back pay and capped punitive damages.' 7 5 The district court
refused to enforce the MAA and denied the employer's motion
compelling arbitration because the arbitration agreement severely limited
the employee's remedies under Title VII. 7 6 The court explained that
164. 39 F. Supp. 2d 582 (D.S.C. 1998).
165. Id. at 599.
166. Id. at 599-60.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 622 (referring to Gilmer court's standards for cases involving arbitration of statutory
ights as authority for invalidating MAA at preliminary injunction hearing rather than allowing
arbitration to go forward).
170. Id. at 623.
171. Hooters of Am., Inc., v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 941 (4th Cir. 1999).
172. Id. at 940.
173. See Denickson v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 81 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1533, 1538 (D.
Md. 1999), aff'd sub nom. Johnson v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 203 F.3d 821 (4th Cir. 1999);
Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1060 (11 th Cir. 1998).
174. 81 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1533, 1538 (D. Md. 1999), aff'd sub nom. Johnson v.
Circuit City Stores, Inc., 203 F.3d 821 (4th Cir. 1999).
175. Id.
176. Id.
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such a provision sheltered the employer, stating, "[The MAA] shields

Circuit City... and prevents Plaintiff from effectively vindicating
her rights." ' Therefore, the court invalidated the provision based on
the Supreme Court's rule in Gilmer and the public policies of Title
VI. 178 In Paladinov. Avnet Technologies,79 the MAA at issue was even
more restrictive, limiting damages to breach of contract only. 80 The
Eleventh Circuit, also citing Gilmer, held that the district court properly
denied enforcement of the provision because it was "fundamentally at
odds with the purposes of Title VII.''
2.

Cases InvolvingImplicit Shelters

Some MAAs implicitly deter employees from filing Title VII
discrimination claims by requiring the employees to pay arbitrator's
fees.' Although in federal court the services of a judge are free to the
litigants,' arbitrator's fees can run between $500 and $1,000 per day.'84
Paying some or all of these fees is beyond the means of many employees
and may make arbitration prohibitively expensive, thereby discouraging
employee claims. 8 s The D.C. Circuit addressed this practice as a matter
of first impression in Cole v. Burns InternationalSecurity Services. 86 In
that case, a former employee filed a federal court complaint for race
discrimination under Title VII despite the fact that his employment
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. 134 F.3d 1054 (llth Cir. 1998).
180. Id. at 1056.
181. Id. at 1060. Restrictions on damages are not the only MAA provisions that have been held to
violate Title V's public policies. Three circuits recently held that the employee may not waive the
jurisdiction of the EEOC over discrimination claims by private agreement. EEOC v. Waffle House,
Inc., 193 F.3d 805, 812 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 68 U.S.L.W. 3726 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2001) (No.
99-1823) (holding that EEOC may litigate on issue of injunctive relief to stop discriminatory
employment practice but may not litigate claim for damages on behalf of plaintiff who signed
MAA); EEOC v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448, 468 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that
jurisdiction of EEOC is exclusive and may not be waived even over claim filed by EEOC on behalf
of plaintiff who signed MAA); EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d 298, 302 (2d Cir. 1998)
(holding that EEOC may litigate issue of injunction but not damages on behalf of plaintiff.
182. Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Srvs, 105 F.3d 1465, 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
183. Id. Of course, even in federal court the employee must bear the burden of other court-related
costs such as filing fees, messenger services, and copy charges. See infra note 199 and
accompanying text.
184. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1480.
185. Id. at 1484; see also Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1235 (10th
Cir. 1999).
186. 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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contract contained an MAA. 8 7 The D.C. Circuit court affirmed the
district court's decision to compel arbitration but ruled that the employer
could not compel the employee to pay some or all of the arbitrator's
fees. "88
' The court took particular notice of the Gilmer requirement that
arbitration should constitute a change of forum, not a change of rights
and remedies.' 8 9 It then concluded that an MAA requiring the employee
to pay some or all of the arbitrator's fees "would surely deter the
bringing of arbitration and constitute a de facto forfeiture of the
employee's statutory rights."' 90 The court found that to enforce such an
MAA would be to change the rights afforded employees by Title VII.' 9 1
The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have also invalidated MAAs that failed
the Cole test because they required the employees to pay the arbitrator's
2
fees.

19

Recently, in Green Tree FinancialCorp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 93 the
Supreme Court addressed the arbitration cost issue in a consumer dispute
over an arbitration clause.' 94 The Court did not cite Cole directly but used
similar reasoning to suggest that a party may seek to invalidate an MAA
on the basis of prohibitive fees. 95 In Green Tree, the consumer argued
that burdensome arbitrator's fees made the MAA void because deterring
Title VII claims violates the public policies behind Title VII. 96 The
Court agreed with this theory but found that the consumer failed to offer
any evidence as to what type of arbitration system would be used or what
the fee assessment procedure was likely to be.' 97 Presumably, an
employee who could present an MAA that explicitly required the
arbitrator to assess fees to the employee, and who could prove that the
fees would prevent him or her from filing a claim, would meet the
burden that Green Tree established.'98

187. Id. at 1467.
188. Id. at 1484.
189. Id. at 1481.
190. Id. at 1468. The court upheld the agreement at issue in Cole because it construed the
language relating to arbitrator's fees to require the employer to pay. Id. at 1486.
191. Id. at 1482.
192. See, e.g., Sbankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1233 (10th Cir. 1999);
Paladino v. Avnet Computer Tecbs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1060 (11 th Cir. 1998).
193. 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
194. Id. at 86.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 87 n.6.
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However, an MAA that merely requires sharing arbitration costs may
be lawful. Courts have distinguished Cole when plaintiffs could not
produce evidence that paying one half of the arbitrator's fees would
prevent them from filing a claim.'99 A requirement that the employee pay
costs that he or she would have had to pay in court does not alter that
employee's access to a foram."0 Thus, these cases are consistent with
Cole, which is premised on the Supreme Court's test articulated in
Gilmer. If the fee burden does not constitute a waiver of forum, and
therefore a waiver of rights and remedies, it is probably valid.20 '
IV. IF AN EMPLOYEE IS FIRED FOR REFUSING TO SIGN A
POTENTIALLY UNLAWFUL MAA, TEE EMPLOYEE
SHOULD HAVE AN ANTI-RETALIATION CLAIM

After such cases as Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips,2 2 in which
the Fourth Circuit denounced the employer's arbitration rules as "so onesided that their only possible purpose is to undermine the neutrality of
the [arbitration], 2 °3 courts have begun to recognize the potential for
abuse in employers' use of MAAs. The judiciary's ultimate conclusion is
that MAAs seeking to limit Title VII rights or remedies are unlawful and
will not be enforced.2' Furthermore, courts have warned that if an
employer succeeds in forcing an employee to sign an unlawful MAA, the
employee may be deterred from filing a discrimination claim." 5
However, if the employee points out the unlawful nature of the MAA
and refuses to sign it, the employer may discharge or discipline the
employee in the name of employment at-will. This Comment argues that
in order to resolve this "Catch-22," the employee should have a viable
cause of action for retaliation against the employer under the antiretaliation provision of Title VII, which protects employees who oppose
employment practices made unlawful by Title VII.

199. McCaskill v. SCI Mgmt. Corp., No. 00-C-1543, 2000 WL 875396, at *3 (N.D. 111.June 22,
2000); Howard v. Anderson, 36 F. Supp. 2d 183, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
200. See Cole v. Bums Int'l. Sec. Svcs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
201. See id.at 1482.
202. 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999).
203. Id. at 938.
204. See supra Part Ill.B.
205. See supranotes 182-185 and accompanying text.
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Admittedly, this solution may push Title Vil's anti-retaliation
provision into uncharted territory.0 6 Traditional retaliation claims
generally arise when employers discipline or fire employees for
complaining about patently discriminatory behavior, such as refusing
showers to black workers but not white workers. 0 7 Furthermore, the
statutory language only refers to employees who complain of "practice[s]
made unlawful" by Title VII, which Title VII defines as intentional or
disparate impact discrimination. 0 8
However novel the idea may seem, allowing a cause of action for
retaliation for MAA opposition is not without legal support. Although
some disputed MAAs may be neither intentionally discriminatory nor
have a disparate impact, courts have found MAAs that reduce statutory
rights and remedies unlawful due to the strong purposes and policies of
Title VII. 2°9 At the same time, courts have broadly construed the
language of the anti-retaliation provision to protect employees in
situations outside the bounds of Title VII's plain language." 0 Therefore,
employee opposition to an MAA that explicitly or implicitly shelters an
employer from Title VII rights or remedies should give rise to a viable
Title VII retaliation claim, even if the MAA in question does not
constitute intentional or disparate impact discrimination. Without
limiting legitimate employer defenses, recognizing such claims would
both prevent employers from circumventing the protections and purpose
of Title VII and encourage employers to draft lawful arbitration
agreements.
A.

An Employee's Opposition to an MAA Made Unlawful by Title VII
or Its Policies Could Give Rise to a Claimfor Retaliation

An analysis of the lawfulness of any MAA or the merits of any Title
VII retaliation claim requires a highly fact-specific inquiry.2" Thus, it is
206. One employee has filed a wrongful termination claim after his employer fired him for
refusing to sign an MAA. Lagatree v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps LLC, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d
664, 668 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). The employee argued that requiring him to sign the MAA-which he
believed to be unlawful-as a condition of employment, was contrary to California public policy. Id.
The court declared that allowing a plaintiff to "strike gold" with such a wrongful termination suit
was "absurd." Id. at 681. However, in that case, the court found the MAA in question to be lawful
and enforceable. Id.
207. Cf. Moyo v. Gomez, 40 F.3d 982, 984 (9th Cir. 1994).
208. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 to e-3 (2000).
209. See supra Part III.B.
210. See supra Part II.B.3.a.
211. See. e.g., Moyo v. Gomez, 40 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 1994).
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essential to distinguish the various situations in which an employee fired
for opposing an unlawful MAA may have a viable retaliation claim. The
four fact patterns below recall Mary (introduced at the outset of this
Comment) and serve as useful illustrations of the analysis that follows.
The first two situations represent more traditional retaliation claims,
where the employee reasonably believes a practice is either intentionally
discriminatory or has a disparate impact. The second two situations
demonstrate why Title VII's anti-retaliation provisions should protect
employees who oppose MAAs made unlawful by the policies behind
Title VII, because these MAAs explicitly or implicitly shelter the
employer from employees' rights and remedies.
First, consider a situation where XYZ presents Mary with an MAA
that states, "By agreeing to arbitration, black employees agree not to file
any claim of discrimination in federal court." She tells XYZ that this
practice is discriminatory and refuses to sign. XYZ fires Mary for
refusing to sign the agreement. This represents a traditional prima facie
retaliation case.212 Mary recognizes that the MAA itself is facially and
intentionally discriminatory, has complained to that effect,213 and has
been fired as a result. While few employers would offer such a patently
discriminatory MAA, this example illustrates that traditional retaliation
claims limit MAAs despite employment at-will arguments.
Second, consider a situation where XYZ presents an MAA that states,
"Employees waive their right to file Title VII discrimination claims in
federal court and agree to submit such claims to arbitration." Mary tells
XYZ that use of the MAA is a discriminatory employment practice
because it will deter her female and minority co-workers from fully
enforcing their legal rights and refuses to sign the agreement. XYZ fires
Mary. This kind of agreement represents a more common MAA, waiving
rights to file a lawsuit in federal court. Federal courts have found that
such MAAs are not unlawful as long as they constitute only a change of
forum. Nevertheless, Mary has opposed the MAA reasonably, believing
it to be discriminatory because it may prevent black co-workers from
bringing a claim. In this situation, the dispositive issue is whether Mary's
belief that the MAA is unlawful on a theory of disparate impact is a
reasonable belief.

212. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
213. The court's analysis will be the same regardless of whether Mary complains to her employer,
the EEOC, or a third party about the alleged unlawful practice. See supra notes 98-101 and
accompanying text.
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Third, consider a situation where XYZ presents an MAA that states,
"If the employee proves intentional employment discrimination on the
part of the employer, the arbitrator may award no more than $1000 in
punitive damages." Mary tells XYZ that this is unlawful because she
heard that in successful discrimination cases plaintiffs can get as much as
$300,000 in punitive damages. She refuses to sign the agreement. XYZ
fires Mary. Such a provision is unlawful because it explicitly shelters
XYZ from the remedies of Title VII and therefore contravenes Title
VII's public policies." 4 Courts can avoid enforcing such provisions in
MAAs using a variety of contract doctrines, including doctrines of
construction, public policy, and unconscionability 1 However, with
respect to the first requirement of a prima facie claim.21 6 Title VII's antiretaliation provision protects employees who complain about a "practice
made unlawful" by Title VII. In other words, "protected activity"
includes complaints about a practice of intentional or disparate impact
employment discrimination, but nothing in the statutory language refers
to protection for employees who oppose practices made unlawful due to
the policies behindTitle VII. 217 Thus, the critical issue is whether Mary's
opposition to a practice that is unlawful based on Title VII's policies is
"protected activity" for retaliation purposes.
Finally, consider a fourth situation in which the MAA states, "The
employee and employer must submit all legal claims arising from
employment to arbitration. Any and all arbitrator's fees shall be paid by
the party bringing a claim." Mary informs XYZ that she will not sign the
MAA because the fees may be excessive and prohibit her or her coworkers from vindicating their rights. XYZ fires Mary for refusing to
sign. Under the standard set forth in Green Tree Financial Corp.Alabama v. Randolph 8 , there is nothing inherently unlawful about an
MAA of this type, unless Mary could show a court that the fees would be
unduly burdensome to her rights under Title VII. 2t 9 Yet, Mary has a
reasonable belief that the MAA's fee provision will preclude her ability
to bring a discrimination claim. That is, she believes the MAA implicitly
shields XYZ from the force of Title VII. Again, the critical issue is

214. See supra notes 163-172 and accompanying text.
215. See supra Part III.B.
216. See supranote 86 and accompanying text.
217. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000).
218. 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
219. Id. at 87 n.6.
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whether Mary's opposition is "protected activity" for the purpose of Title
VII's anti-retaliation provision.
B.

Title Vi's Anti-RetaliationProvisionShould ProtectEmployees
Who Have a ReasonableBelief That an MA Is an Unlawful
Practice Under Title VII orIts Policies

While the first factual scenario encompasses a traditional retaliation
claim, where the discriminatory practice complained of is obvious, the
other three present more challenging issues likely to arise in the context
of an employee opposing an MAA. If an employee believes an MAA is
intentionally discriminatory or has a disparate impact, as in the second
scenario, Title VII's anti-retaliation provision should protect him or her
if the belief is reasonable, even if the MAA is legal." 0 The issue raised in
the third and fourth scenarios is whether the provision should protect
employees who oppose employment practices made unlawful by the
policies behind Title VII, rather than the plain language of Title VII
itself. In other words, is an employee's opposition "protected activity"
when the employee opposes a practice that contradicts the policies of
Title VII? Retaliation liability is broader than discrimination liability. 1
Anti-retaliation provisions extend to a number of circumstances not
expressly addressed by Title VII and effectuates Congress's purpose in
protecting employees who report potentially unlawful practices.' m
Therefore, courts should extend this same protection to employees who
reasonably oppose MAAs that explicitly or implicitly shelter employers
from employee rights and remedies in violation of the policies and
purposes of Title VII.
1.

Title Vi's Anti-RetaliationProvision Should Protect an Employee
Who Has a ReasonableBelief That an MA Is an Unlawful
Employment PracticeUnder Title VII

Title VII's anti-retaliation provision should protect employees fired
for opposing MAAs they reasonably believe are intentionally
discriminatory or have a disparate impact on certain classes of
employees. According to Moyo v. Gomez' the broad protection of Title

220. See supranote 121 and accompanying text.
221. See supra Part Il.B.3.a and accompanying text.
222. See supraPart Il.B.3.a.
223. 40 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 1994).
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VII encompasses even those employees who mistakenly believe an
employer's practice is discriminatory.22 4 Title VII itself does not afford
such protection, and a rule that protects employees who report practices
that are actually lawful seems contrary to the plain language of the
statute. 225 Yet anti-retaliation provision coverage extends to such
employees.226
There is no reason that the same broad protection should not apply to
employees who oppose MAAs. In an MAA opposition claim, the
employee may have a reasonable belief that the MAA is unlawful under
Title VII. For example, an employee, such as Mary in the second
scenario, could contend that use of the MAA has a disparate impact on
racial minorities. If members of this Title VII protected class are more
likely to refuse to sign the MAA, these minority employees might be
fired. Meanwhile, white employees who may not be as concerned about
Title VII protections may sign the MAA and remain employed. Thus, the
MAA may disparately impact minority employment. 227 This disparate
impact is analogous to Griggs v. Duke Power,22 1 where the Supreme
Court found that a standardized test administered to all employees as a
condition of employment operated to exclude blacks and was not related
to job performance.229

An employee would not have to be correct about this legal theory to
be protected from retaliation. 23 ° He or she would simply need a
reasonable belief that the MAA constitutes an unlawful employment
practice under Title VII. 231 In Moyo, the Ninth Circuit used a broad
standard for "reasonable," basing it on the limited factual and legal
knowledge available to most employees.232 This means that an employee
would not need statistical data or a sophisticated understanding of the
disparate impact theory to sustain a claim of retaliation,even though he
or she would need such data to win a claim of discrimination.Thus, if an
224. See supra notes 110-121 and accompanying text.
225. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a) (2000). The language of the statute refers only to practices made
unlawful by Title VII.
226. See supra Part II.B.3.a.
227. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A).
228. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
229. Id. at431.
230. See supra notes 110-121 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 110-121 and accompanying text. Although it is not discussed in detail, some
courts have also mentioned that the employee must have a "good faith" belief. See, e.g., Moyo v.
Gomez, 40 F.3d 982, 984 (9th Cir. 1994).
232. Moyo, 40 F.3d at 985.
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employee observed a number of black employees quit rather than sign an
MAA while white employees signed the MAA, this could be the basis
for the reasonable belief that the MAA is unlawful and could sustain a
retaliation claim."
2.

Title Vi's Anti-RetaliationProvisionShouldProtect an Employee
Opposingan MAA Because It Violates the StrongPublicPolicies
Behind Title VII

In Title VII retaliation claims, courts should interpret "protected
activity" to include not only opposition to intentionally discriminatory
employment practices or those with disparate impact, but also opposition
to MAAs that explicitly or implicitly shelter employers from Title VII
rights or remedies and are unlawful under the policies and purposes of
Title VII. The use of MAAs that restrict substantive rights and remedies
under any federal statute is unlawful according to the rule in Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 4 that arbitration
constitutes only a change of forum." Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane
Corp."2 6 and Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams "37 recognized that only
arbitration systems that fully protect an employee's statutory rights and
remedies are acceptable replacements for courts.35 Thus, if an MAA
allows an employee the same rights and remedies he or she would have
in court, the employer may legally require the employee to waive the
right to file a claim in federal court. 9
However, courts routinely invalidate MAAs explicitly or implicitly
sheltering employers from compliance with Title VII. Such sheltering
includes capping damages at an artificially low amount, preventing
employees from filing claims with the EEOC, establishing patently
unfair arbitration systems, or requiring employees to pay burdensome

233. Also, because the employee does not have to be a member of a protected class to be safe
from retaliation, there is no requirement that the plaintiff show that the MAA restricts his or her own

rights and remedies under Title VII. See supra notes 105-109 and accompanying text. Therefore, the
employee need only demonstrate a reasonable belief that use of the MAA is an unlawful
employment practice as applied to his or her co-workers who may otherwise be protected by Title
VII.
234. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
235. Id. at 628.
236. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
237. 121 S.Ct. 1302 (2001).
238. Id. at 1313; Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
239. Gilmer,500 U.S. at 26.
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arbitrator's fees.24 ° Courts have used both contract theory and the policies

employees to "forgo the
behind Title VII to invalidate terms that ' cause
241
substantive rights afforded by the statute.
The FAA requires courts to enforce MAAs unless they are invalid
under traditional contract law.242 Therefore, federal courts have used
various contract theories to invalidate MAAs that hinder Title VII. For
example, the Supreme Court in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.243
construed the MAA narrowly to exclude Title VII claims from its
scope, 244 while the Cole v. Burns InternationalSecurity Services24 court
read the MAA to require the employer to pay all arbitrator's fees to avoid
perpetuating an implicit Title VII shelter.24 6 In Hooters of America, Inc.,
v. Phillips,247 the court found the MAA itself to be lawful, but refused to
compel arbitration because the employer had breached the MAA by
promulgating patently unfair arbitration rules. 248 The Derrickson v.
Circuit City Stores, Inc. 24 9 and Paladino v. Avnet Technologiess.

courts refused to compel arbitration because the MAAs in both cases
contained damage restrictions that violated Title VII's public policies.2 5,
Although the legal means employed by courts have varied, the end has
always been to invalidate MAAs that explicitly limit employees' rights
and remedies under Title VII.
Concurrent with their invalidation of unlawful MAAs, courts have
also construed "protected activity" beyond Title VII's plain language in
order to effectuate Title VII's policies and purposes." 2 The Fifth Circuit
observed that in order for Title VII's anti-retaliation provision to be
effective, "appropriate informal opposition to perceived discrimination

240. See supra Part 1II.B.

241. Id. at 26.
242. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
243. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
244. Id. at 42.
245. 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
246. Id. at 1485.
247. 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999).
248. Hooters, 173 F.3d at 940.
249. 81 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1533 (D. Md. 1999), aff'd sub nom. Johnson v. Circuit City
Stores, Inc., 203 F.3d 821 (4th Cir. 1999).
250. 134 F.3d 1054 (11 th Cir. 1998).
251. Derrickson, 81 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1538; Paladino,134 F.3d at 1059-60.
252. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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'
To avoid this
must not be chilled by the fear of retaliatory action."253
chilling of opposition, the Ninth Circuit in EEOC v. Crown Zellerbach
Corp. 4 extended the meaning of "protected activity" to include
employee complaints about discrimination to customers of the
employer." In Maynard v. City of San Jose, 6 the court held that
"protected activity" included a white employee's assistance of a black
co-worker because to deny the white employee's retaliation claim would
perpetuate the harmful effects of discriminatory behavior in
contravention of Title VII's purpose. 7 Finally, in Moyo, the court used
the "reasonable belief' rule to extend "protected activity" to include
opposition to practices that are lawful under Title VII."8 The lesson of
these cases is clear: courts should broadly construe "protected activity"
beyond the plain language of the anti-retaliation provision when doing so
will effectuate the purposes of Title VII.
Therefore, an employee who opposes an MAA that restricts Title VII
rights and remedies does so with the Court's support. Because courts
have also sought to effectuate the purposes and prevent the
circumvention of Title VII by extending anti-retaliation protection
beyond the statute's plain language, the provision should protect an
employee fired for opposing an MAA made unlawful by the policies
behind Title VII. Furthermore, because courts have invalidated explicit
and implicit shelters alike, this protection should be extended to
employees who oppose MAAs that contain implicitly unlawful feesharing provisions, such as the MAA in scenario four, as well as those
who oppose more explicit violations such as the damage restrictions in
scenario three. If the MAA's end result is a potentially unlawful Title VII
shelter, an employee should have the right to oppose the MAA.
This argument should be particularly cogent in the Ninth Circuit and
the eight other federal circuits where the "reasonable belief' rule
applies. 9 Employees are not expected to be familiar with all the factual
and legal issues in a potential case.26 The average employee may not
have the legal sophistication required to discern between employment
253. Payne v. McLemore's Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1138 (5th Cir. 1981)
(quoting Hearth v. Metro. Transit Comm'n, 436 F. Supp. 685, 688-89 (D. Minn. 1977)).
254. 720 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir 1983).
255. Id. at 1012.
256. 37 F.3d 1396 (9th Cir. 1994).
257. Id. at 1403.
258. Moyo v. Gomez, 40 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 1994).
259. See supranotes 110-121 and accompanying text.
260. Moyo, 40 F.3d at 985.
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practices made unlawful by Title VII's plain language and those that
contravene Title VII's policies and purposes. The employee's reasonable
belief should prevent outright dismissal of the claim. For example, if
scenario four occurred in the Ninth Circuit and Mary filed a retaliation
claim, the Moyo rule would apply and the burden would be whether or
not she had a reasonable belief that the fee-splitting agreement
contradicts the policies of Title VII. Whether a practice that contradicts
Title VI's public policies is a "practice made unlawful" according to the
anti-retaliation provision's plain language would then be subjected to the
court's analysis of "reasonable" in Moyo and subsequent cases. 2 6' The
court would have to determine whether an average employee would have
believed that the MAA restricted his or her ability to bring a claim.
While Mary may ultimately be mistaken about the provision's illegality,
she can still sustain a retaliation claim with a reasonable belief.
Accordingly, an employee's reasonable belief that an employment
practice contradicts the policies of Title VII should trigger the
protections of Title VIl's anti-retaliation provision regardless of whether
Title VII's plain language or policies are the source of the illegality, or
whether the provision would be enforceable if signed.
3.

ProtectingEmployees Who Oppose MAAs That ContradictTitle VII
Will PreventEmployersfrom GainingLeverage over Employees'
Title VIIRights

Courts should construe Title VII's anti-retaliation provision to protect
employees who oppose MAAs that contradict the policies of Title VII
because the current legal alternatives leave many employees with few
legal options with regard to their Title VII rights. Without the provision's
protection, an employee who believes an MAA subverts Title VII has
two options: refusing to sign and finding another job or signing and then
challenging the MAA if a discrimination claim arises. However, the
choice of whether to sign may actually mean choosing between
employment and rights, while signing and challenging may place a series
of obstacles between an employee and his or her Title VII rights.
While the employment at-will doctrine legitimately compels an
employee's choice between resigning and continuing employment under
changed conditions, a closer look reveals that for a class of cases the
choice may really be between continued employment and the employee's

261. See supra notes 110-121 and accompanying text.
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Title VII rights. 62 A cause of action for wrongful termination would only
apply to current employees. Employers might present MAAs to
employees who have complained of discrimination or who might be at a
higher risk of filing a Title VII complaint.263 Thus, requiring an employee
to choose between keeping his or her job by signing an vAA that
restricts access to Title Vi's remedial scheme and quitting with his or
her Title VII rights intact produces the same result: a diminishment of the
employee's Title VII rights. Allowing a cause of action for wrongful
termination would prevent employers from using the presumptions of
employment at-will to restrict their employees' Title VII rights.
Alternatively, if the employee signs the MAA in order to continue
working, the employer might gain unfair leverage with respect to the
employee's Title VII rights. First, the employee may be deterred from
filing a Title VII claim at all. Employees might believe that once they
sign the agreement, it is binding regardless of the circumstances under
which it was signed.2 If an employee thinks that the employer's
arbitration scheme is prohibitively expensive or unfair, he or she may
decide that filing a claim is unfeasible or futile. This is what the Cole
court identified as an MAA with a deterrent effect on the filing of Title
VII claims.265 Also, having to litigate the validity of the arbitration clause
in addition to the discrimination claim might increase the time and
expense parties must invest in a Title VII case. Such additional costs may
ultimately favor employers, who may be better able to absorb additional
litigation costs than employees.
Recognizing a cause of action for wrongful termination when a
current employee refuses to sign an MAA that contradicts Title VII's
policies could prevent employers from taking advantage of this Catch-22
with regard to an employee's Title VII rights. Ultimately, Title VII was
designed as a limitation on employment at-will that protects employee
rights.266 Employers should not be able to use the presumption of

262. See Hoffman, supranote 4, at 153.
263. A few courts have identified and condemned "preemptive retaliation," which is the practice
of firing an employee who the employer fears may make a discrimination complaint in the future.
See, e.g., Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1128 (10th Cir. 1993).
264. Basic principles of contract law dictate that parties who sign contracts are presumed to have
read and understood the terms. See, e.g., Golenia v. Bob Baker Toyota, 915 F. Supp. 201, 204 (S.D.
Cal. 1996). Furthermore, the argument that requiring an employee to sign an MAA to keep his or her
job makes the MAAs an illegal contract of adhesion has been rejected by some courts. See id.; Lang
v. Burlington Northern R.R, 835 F. Supp. 1104,1106 (D. Minn. 1993).
265. Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
266. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
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employment at-will to limit those rights, either by putting employees to a
choice between continued employment and their Title VII rights, or by
using an MAA as a disincentive on the exercise of those rights. The
threat of suit for wrongful termination is one way to restrain the very
imbalance in the employment relationship that Title VII seeks to
eliminate.
C.

IncludingMAA Opposition in the Scope of "ProtectedActivity"
DiscouragesEmployersfrom DraftingMAAs Unfairly in Their
Own Favor

There is great temptation for employers to lessen their potential
Title
2 67
Courts'
VII liability by drafting MAAs to their own advantage.
recognition of Title VII retaliation claims premised on MAA opposition
would reduce an employer's ability both to draft MAAs thwarting Title
Vil's policies and to fire employees who question the practice. In turn,
the adverse effects these agreements have on the enforcement of Title
VII could diminish. Retaliation claims could motivate those employers
who willfully or negligently draft unlawful agreements to redraft them.
Recognizing this cause of action should ultimately decrease litigation by
producing binding arbitration agreements that fully protect Title VII
rights and remedies.
D.

An Employer May Defend Against an Employee's Retaliation Claim
by Showing that No CausalNexus Exists Between the Employee's
Oppositionto the MAA andHis or Her Termination

To defend against a claim of retaliation, the employer may offer
evidence that breaks the causal link between the employee's protected
activity and the dismissal. Were an employee to offer a prima facie case
that he or she was dismissed for expressing opposition to a potentially
unlawful MAA, the employer could establish legitimate reasons for the
dismissal and defeat the claim. 6 8 For example, it would not matter if the
employee engaged in "protected activity" if the employer fired him or
her for habitual tardiness.2 69 Also, if the employee opposed the agreement
267. Maltby, supra note 12, at 5.
268. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Folkerson v. Circus
Circus Enters., 107 F.3d 754, 755 (9th Cir. 1997); EEOC v. Avery Dennison Corp., 104 F.3d 858,
860 (6th Cir. 1997).
269. See, e.g., Hochstadt v. Worcester Found. for Experimental Biology, 545 F.2d 222, 234 (1st
Cir. 1976).
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in an excessively disruptive or illegal way, and that behavior was the true
reason for dismissal, then the retaliation claim should also fail.27 In these
situations, the employer would not be firing the employee for opposing
an unlawful practice, but for legitimate, lawful reasons that would justify
any employer's dismissal of any employee.
V.

CONCLUSION

With increasing numbers of employers turning to mandatory
arbitration for conflict resolution, the number of opportunities for courts
to adjudicate employment disputes is decreasing. Therefore, pursuant to
Supreme Court mandate, courts must take every precaution to ensure that
arbitration agreements provide the same Title VII rights and remedies
that employees would have in a courtroom. Congress created Title VII's
anti-retaliation provision to ensure that employers would not find ways to
circumvent Title VII's mandate. Consistent with Congressional policy,
courts have construed employers' retaliation liability more broadly than
employers' discrimination liability. Accordingly, if an MAA undermines
Title VII's discrimination protections, an employee should be able to
reject that MAA. If he is discharged, he should have a viable claim under
Title VII's anti-retaliation provision.

270. Bartulica v. Paculdo, 411 F. Supp. 392,397 (D. Mo. 1976).

990

THIS ISSUE OF THE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
IS DEDICATED TO THE MEMORY OF
HARRY MAYBURY CROSS

HARRY MAYBURY CROSS

